



Jasmin: high-assurance high-speed cryptography

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Efficient, correct, safe, and secure

```
fn memeq(reg u64 p q n) -> reg u64 {
    reg u64 r one i;
    r = 0;
    one = 1;
    i = 0;
    while (i < n) {
        if (r != 0) {
            reg u64 a b;
            a = [p];
            b = [q];
            r = a != b ? one : r;
            p += 8;
            q += 8;
        }
        i = #INC(i);
    }
    return r;
}
```

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```
fn memeq(reg u64 p q n) -> reg u64 {
    reg u64 r one i;
    r = 0; → memeq:
    one = 1; → movq $0, %rax
    i = 0; → movq $1, %rcx
    while (i < n) {
        if (r != 0) {
            reg u64 a b;
            a = [p]; → movq $0, %r8
            b = [q]; → jmp Lmemeq$1
            r = a != b ? one : r; → Lmemeq$2:
            → cmpq $0, %rax
            → je Lmemeq$3
            → movq (%rdi), %r9
            → movq (%rsi), %r10
            → cmpq %r10, %r9
            → cmovne %rcx, %rax
            p += 8; → addq $8, %rdi
            q += 8; → addq $8, %rsi
        }
        i = #INC(i); → Lmemeq$3:
    }
    return r;
}
```

The diagram illustrates the assembly code generation for the `memeq` function. It shows how C variables are mapped to registers and memory locations in the generated assembly. Annotations include labels for loops (`Lmemeq$1`, `Lmemeq$2`, `Lmemeq$3`) and conditional branches (`je Lmemeq$3`).

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    reg u64 r one i;
    r = 0; → memeq:
    one = 1; → movq $0, %rax
    i = 0; → movq $1, %rcx
    while (i < n) {
        if (r != 0) {
            reg u64 a b;
            a = [p]; → movq $0, %r8
            b = [q]; → jmp Lmemeq$1
            r = a != b ? one : r; → Lmemeq$2:
            p += 8; → cmpq $0, %rax
            q += 8; → je Lmemeq$3
        }
        i = #INC(i); → movq (%rdi), %r9
    }
    return r;
}
```

The assembly code generated for the `memeq` function is as follows:

```
memeq:
    movq $0, %rax
    movq $1, %rcx
    movq $0, %r8
    jmp Lmemeq$1
Lmemeq$2:
    cmpq $0, %rax
    je Lmemeq$3
    movq (%rdi), %r9
    movq (%rsi), %r10
    cmpq %r10, %r9
    cmovne %rcx, %rax
    addq $8, %rdi
    addq $8, %rsi
Lmemeq$3:
    incq %r8
Lmemeq$1:
    cmpq %rdx, %r8
    jb Lmemeq$2
    ret
```

A red dashed arrow points from the `#INC(i)` instruction to the `incq %r8` instruction in the assembly code.

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```
fn memeq(reg u64 p q n) -> reg u64 { ..... > memeq:  
    reg u64 r one i;  
    r = 0;  
    one = 1;  
    i = 0;  
    while (i < n) { ..... > Lmemeq$2:  
        if (r != 0) { ..... > Lmemeq$3:  
            reg u64 a b;  
            a = [p];  
            b = [q];  
            r = a != b ? one : r;  
            p += 8;  
            q += 8;  
        } ..... > Lmemeq$3:  
        i = #INC(i);  
    } ..... > Lmemeq$1:  
    return r; ..... > ret  
}
```

The diagram illustrates the translation of a C function into assembly language. The C code defines a function `memeq` that takes three arguments (`p`, `q`, `n`) and returns a register (`r`). It initializes `r` to 0, `one` to 1, and `i` to 0. It then enters a `while` loop where it compares the bytes at `p` and `q`. If they are not equal, it sets `r` to `one` and increments `i`. The assembly code follows this structure, with labels `Lmemeq$2` and `Lmemeq$3` marking the loop header and the point after the comparison respectively. The assembly uses registers `%rax`, `%rcx`, `%r8`, `%rdi`, and `%rsi`. It performs byte comparisons using `cmpq` and handles inequality with `cmovne`. It also uses `addq` to increment pointers `p` and `q` by 8 bytes each iteration. The final `ret` instruction exits the function.

Correctness

- Specification is secure
- Implementation \iff specification

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Safety

- Termination
- Array accesses in bounds
- Arithmetic errors

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Constant time

Runtime does not depend on secrets

- Control flow
- Memory accesses

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Speculative constant time

CT even under speculative execution

Safety - uninitialized values

```
export
fn uninitialized() -> reg u64 {
    reg u64 x;
    x = x + 1; // Uninitialized read from x.
    return x;
}
```

Safety - division by zero

```
export
fn arithmetic(reg u64 x y) -> reg u64 {
    x = x / y; // y could be zero.
    return x;
}
```

Safety - out of bounds access

```
export
fn index(reg u64 x) -> reg u64 {
    stack u64[1] s;
    s[x] = 0; // x could be out of bounds.
    x = s[0]; // s[0] could be uninitialized
    return x;
}
```

Safety - termination

```
export
fn termination(reg u64 n) -> reg u64 {
    reg u64 i;
    i = 0;
    while (i <= n) { // n could be 2^64-1
        i += 1;
    }
    return i;
}
```

Safety - memory accesses

```
export
fn alignment(reg u64 p) {
    [#aligned p] = 0; // p needs to be 64bit-aligned.
}

export
fn memset(reg u64 p, reg u8 c, reg u64 n) {
    reg u64 i;
    i = 0;
    while (i < n) {
        (u8)[p + i] = c;
        i += 1;
    }
}
```

Side-channel - memeq 1/2

```
export
fn memeq(#public reg u64 p q n) -> #public reg u64 {
    reg u64 r one i;
    r = 0; one = 1; i = 0;
    while (i < n) {
        reg u64 a b;
        a = [p + i * 8];
        b = [q + i * 8];
        r = one if a != b;
        i += 1;
    }
    #declassify r = r;
    return r;
}
```

Side-channel - memeq 2/2

```
fn memeq_early_abort(#public reg u64 p q n) -> #public reg u64 {
    reg u64 i x
    reg u8 r;
    i = 0;
    while (i < n) {
        reg u64 a b;
        a = [p + i * 8];
        b = [q + i * 8];
        i = n if a != b;
        i += 1;
    }
    r = #SETcc(i == n);
    #declassify x = (64u)r;
    return x;
}
```

Side-channel - strlen 1/2

```
fn strlen(#public reg u64 s) -> #public reg u64 {
    reg u64 i;
    i = 0;

    reg u8 c;
    while {
        c = (u8)[s + i];
    } (c != 0) {
        i += 1;
    }

    return i;
}
```

Side-channel - strlen 2/2

```
fn strlen_ct(#public reg u64 s) -> #public reg u64 {
    reg u64 i;
    i = 0;

    reg bool is_null;
    while {
        reg u8 c;
        c = (u8)[s + i];
        #declassify is_null = c != 0;
    } (is_null) {
        i += 1;
    }

    return i;
}
```

Spectre attacks - strlen

```
fn strlen_sct(#transient reg u64 s) -> #public reg u64 {
    reg u64 msf i;
    msf = #init_msf(); i = 0;
    reg u8 is_null c;
    while {
        c = (u8)[s + i];
        #declassify is_null = #SETcc(c != 0);
        is_null = #protect_8(is_null, msf);
    } (is_null == 1) {
        msf = #update_msf(is_null == 1, msf);
        i += 1;
    }
    return i;
}
```



Jasmin: github.com/jasmin-lang/jasmin

EasyCrypt specifications: github.com/formosa-crypto/crypto-specs

Libjade: github.com/formosa-crypto/libjade